

Balochistan Human Rights Group Annual Report 2024

Balochistan Human Rights Group (BHRG) is independent and non-profit human rights Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), that works on providing information to fill the gaps cause by the lack of independent media in Balochistan through investigation, effective communication and gathering reliable documents.

BHRG provides relevant, verified and up-to date information regarding the human rights situation in Western Balochistan.



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Introduction

According to Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, all Iranian citizens, regardless of ethnicity, race, or language, are entitled to equal rights, and factors such as color, language, and race shall not confer any privilege. Furthermore, Article 12 of the Constitution stipulates that the official religion is Twelver Shia Islam, but other Islamic sects, including Sunni Islam, are fully respected, and their followers must not face pressure due to their religion.

Despite these constitutional principles, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran are frequently violated in various forms. For example, Baloch children are denied the opportunity to receive education in their mother tongue and are deprived of learning their native language. Many Baloch children lack birth certificates, which is another form of human rights violation in Balochistan. Governmental institutions, particularly security agencies such as the County Security Councils—often headed by non-Baloch officials—are the primary obstacles preventing the issuance of these identity documents.

Despite the Islamic Republic's slogans in support of the underprivileged and the Constitution's emphasis on equality among citizens, Baloch-majority regions in Iran, such as Sistan and Balochistan province, are among the most underprivileged areas in terms of welfare and economic indicators. The policy of imposing poverty and exerting pressure on the Baloch people, alongside governmental efforts to isolate and suppress them, has persisted not only since the 1979 revolution but also in the preceding era. For decades, central governments have sought to dominate the natural and underground resources of Balochistan.

Efforts to impose poverty and deprivation, coupled with identity suppression, are not confined to Sistan and Balochistan but are also severe in other regions like southern South Khorasan, southern Kerman (known as Rudbar-e-Zamin), and eastern Hormozgan (known as Gyavan-Zamin), which are historically part of Balochistan. These areas have



faced harsh pressures and oppression. Most of the population in these regions are Baloch, who, due to land planning policies and the creation of smaller provinces by the central government, have been separated from their ancestral homeland and now live as minorities in these provinces.

This minority status has worsened their living conditions, economic opportunities, and infrastructure—such as healthcare, transportation, and education—compared to the already poor conditions in Sistan and Balochistan. Ironically, these communities were detached from their homeland under the pretext of facilitating better development and regional planning.

Systematic oppression, maximum pressure, lack of access to basic welfare services, and insufficient infrastructure for livelihoods have marginalized the Baloch people, forcing some of them to turn to precarious activities like fuel carrying (known as "sootbari") to survive.

In the subsequent sections of this report, we will thoroughly examine issues such as:

- Executions
- Unlawful shootings and extrajudicial killings of Baloch citizens by military and security forces
- The phenomenon of "unknown armed individuals" and their attacks on citizens
- The issue of fuel carrying, its dangers, and why people resort to it
- Demolition of homes and confiscation of ancestral lands by various governmental and security entities
- Deaths of Baloch prisoners in custody
- Summoning and interrogating Baloch citizens and activists
- Arrests, the conditions of workers, and the critical issue of Baloch children
- Statistics on drowning incidents in 2024



This report aims to present verified evidence and documentation of human rights violations in Balochistan. It is important to note that the statistics provided here only include cases that BHRG Network has been able to verify or document. Therefore, the actual figures may be significantly higher due to communication challenges in some areas of Balochistan.

1. Execution of Baloch Prisoners

The death penalty, historically considered the harshest form of punishment in criminal law, has been abolished or restricted to exceptional cases in over 170 countries worldwide. However, Iran remains among the few nations that extensively implement the death penalty for a wide range of offenses. The country consistently ranks among those with the highest execution rates globally, sentencing hundreds of individuals to death annually. These executions span crimes such as drug-related offenses, murder, and even political and civil activities.

The Islamic Republic's approach to executions not only contravenes fundamental human rights principles but also frequently violates international standards of fair trials. Human rights organizations have repeatedly accused the Iranian government of using executions as a tool to suppress political opposition, intimidate society, and silence dissenting voices. In many cases, defendants are denied access to independent legal counsel, coerced into confessions under torture, and tried in opaque judicial processes. This approach, beyond violating the right to life, has profound social and psychological consequences for families and communities, exacerbating feelings of insecurity and distrust among the public.

Execution Statistics Among Baloch Prisoners

Although Baloch individuals constitute approximately 5% of Iran's population, they account for nearly 30% of all executions nationwide, highlighting systemic



discrimination and severe human rights violations. Executions of Baloch prisoners often occur without fair trials and with violations of their fundamental rights, such as being denied access to independent lawyers.

Many families of executed individuals have contested the death sentences in interviews with the BHRG Network, asserting that their relatives rejected the charges in court. Nevertheless, judges issued death sentences, often disregarding the lack of evidence. In cases related to drug offenses, some families claimed their relatives were unaware of illicit substances being concealed in vehicles or cargo they were hired to transport.

One example involves Amir Hamzeh Barahouei Mojarad, who was arrested in Birjand in 2019 on drug-related charges and sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court. After appealing the initial verdict, the Supreme Court overturned the sentence due to insufficient evidence. However, a retrial at a parallel branch of the Revolutionary Court in South Khorasan once again sentenced him to death. Both Amir Hamzeh and his family maintained that no drugs were ever found in his possession.

Additionally, many executed individuals were subjected to torture during interrogations, leading to forced confessions. This practice has heightened human rights concerns regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities in Iran.

Security Agencies' Exploitation of Execution Sentences

The pervasive influence of security agencies in Balochistan often forces judiciary officials, such as prosecutors, to follow the directives of case investigators, who are typically affiliated with security services. In several cases, security forces have used the threat of execution as leverage to coerce detainees or their families into cooperating with political assassinations.



For example, on November 13, 2023, three Baloch political prisoners—Mohammad Karim Barakzai Akson (28), Mohammad Barahouei Anjamini (28), and Edris Balerani (31)—were executed in Zahedan Central Prison. A recording of Mohammad Karim from inside prison reveals that Ministry of Intelligence officials had offered to release him and his co-defendants in exchange for assassinating Molavi Abdulhamid Ismaeelzahi, the prominent Sunni Friday Prayer Leader of Zahedan, and other opposition figures. The prisoners refused, and Mohammad Karim stated in the recording:

"In 2019, I, Mohammad Barahouei, and Edris Balerani were arrested by the Ministry of Intelligence and endured two months of physical and psychological torture. Our families were also harassed by intelligence officers."

Other Cases of Coercion

On April 30, 2024, Mahmoud Gorgij (Mangeli), along with several other inmates, was executed in Birjand Prison on drug-related charges. In his final phone call to his family, Mahmoud revealed:

"Intelligence officers came to me in prison and said, 'Tell your family to assassinate a few government opponents abroad, and we will cancel your death sentence and release you.' I refused because I lived my life with honor and integrity."

He added:

"I told them I would not kill anyone to save my own life. If you want to execute me, go ahead, but I will not take someone else's life to save my own."

Broader Implications

The use of executions, particularly against Baloch political prisoners and ordinary detainees, as a means of control and intimidation, has exacerbated concerns over Iran's treatment of ethnic and religious minorities. These actions reflect a broader policy of



suppression and discrimination, contributing to the marginalization of the Baloch people and further isolating the Islamic Republic on the international stage.

The disproportionate execution rates, lack of fair trials, and coercion tactics used by security agencies underline the urgent need for international attention and intervention to address the systemic injustices faced by the Baloch community.

Media Challenges Related to Executions

Lack of transparency and pressure from security institutions on the families of executed individuals are among the most significant media challenges regarding executions in Iran, particularly within the Baloch community. Families are often threatened to refrain from disseminating or publicizing information about the executions. These threats include harassment by security forces, pressure on relatives, and denial of legal rights, such as access to the bodies of executed individuals.

This environment makes the actual number of executions higher than what is officially reported or verified by independent organizations.

Executions Among the Baloch Community in 2024

An overview of the statistics related to the executions of Baloch prisoners indicates that the Islamic Republic uses executions as a tool for systematic oppression. In 2024, at least 111 Baloch prisoners were executed on various charges in 23 cities across Iran. Among these, Zahedan Prison recorded the highest number of executions (27), followed by Yazd (14) and Birjand (13).

Notably, at least two of the executed individuals lacked official identification documents, such as birth certificates, while one was a person with mental health issues holding a red medical card.




The statistics also show a sharp rise in executions during the last quarter of the year, with 51 executions in the final three months. December witnessed the highest number of executions, with 22 individuals put to death, making it the deadliest month of the year for the Baloch community.

Of the 111 executed individuals in 2024:

- 83 were charged with drug-related offenses (74.8%)
- 25 were charged with murder (22.5%)
- The charges against 3 individuals (2.7%) remain unclear

The Charges of Executed Prisoners





Comparison with 2023


A comparison with 2023, when 184 Baloch prisoners were executed in various prisons across Iran, reveals a decrease of approximately 40% in the number of executions in 2024.

Execution Statistics by Charge

Based on available documentation:

- 74.8% of those executed were charged with drug-related crimes
- 22.5% were charged with murder (Qisas)
- 2.7% had charges that could not be confirmed

Execution Statistics by City






The following data illustrates the distribution of executions based on the cities where prisons are located: (Note: The exact breakdown was in the form of a chart in the original document, requiring further graphical representation.)

Execution statistics based on the months of 2024

The obtained statistics show that the number of executions of Balochi prisoners has increased in the second half of the year, and in the last four months of 2024, it has risen to an unusually high level. In September 14 people were executed, in October 13 people, in November 16 people, and in December 22 people were executed on various charges in Iranian prisons.



The Islamic Republic of Iran, through its media outlets, has made significant efforts over the past decades to portray Baloch citizens with false labels such as terrorists, smugglers, and more. Drug-related accusations are also part of this policy, which has led to the majority of executed Baloch prisoners being hanged on drug-related charges



in the prisons of the Islamic Republic. Meanwhile, Balochistan ranks at the lowest level among other provinces in terms of economic indicators and job creation. The lack of stable employment has resulted in social disruptions and issues such as unemployment.

Reasons Behind Baloch Citizens Turning to Informal Work and the Role of the Government

In July 2024, the Iranian newspaper Tose'e Irani cited data from the Iranian Statistics Center, reporting that Sistan and Balochistan province had the highest unemployment rate in the country at 12.3%. Although the accuracy of statistics provided by the Islamic Republic is often questioned, on-the-ground observations and experiences suggest that the real unemployment rate in Balochistan is significantly worse. Even the official statistics, however, confirm the government's deliberate policy of imposing poverty and deprivation as a means to serve its propaganda narratives.

Unemployment in Balochistan has driven many individuals to take up informal jobs, such as fuel carriers (sootbari) and freight transportation, which the Islamic Republic labels as "smuggling." The majority of those sentenced to death on drug-related charges in Iran are transport workers who, out of desperation, take on these jobs, often working as hired drivers to move goods from one point to another. The actual owners of the cargo usually face no harm beyond financial loss when these transport workers are caught.

In many instances, individuals are unaware of the exact contents of the goods they are transporting. Numerous cases exist where the judicial system issues execution sentences without considering the testimonies of the accused.

Additionally, the Islamic Republic has pursued policies aimed at isolating ethnic groups like the Baloch, portraying them negatively as "smugglers," "outlaws," or "terrorists." This propaganda serves to justify the exploitation of Balochistan's natural and



underground resources and the systemic denial of essential government services to the Baloch people—services that are a fundamental right of every citizen.

2. Unregulated Shootings by Security Forces and Extrajudicial Killings of Baloch Citizens

The Law on the Use of Firearms was initially approved under the title "On the Use of Firearms by Law Enforcement Officers" in necessary cases, consisting of 17 articles and 13 notes, in the 18th session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles) on January 7, 1995, and was confirmed by the Guardian Council on January 28 of the same year. Article 3 of this law outlines the circumstances under which law enforcement officers are permitted to use firearms. However, in many areas of Iran, including Balochistan, security forces frequently engage in shootings toward citizens without adhering to the conditions set forth in this law, resulting in deaths and injuries. Armed personnel are only allowed to use firearms under the following conditions: first, there must be no other alternative, and second, if possible, they must follow the order of: A - "warning shot," B-"shooting below the waist," C - "shooting above the waist." However, evidence and records show that none of these conditions are followed by military and security personnel in many incidents in Balochistan.

Military and security institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Sistan and Balochistan province, as well as in other Baloch-majority areas such as Rudbar-e-Zamin in southern Kerman, Giavan Zamin in eastern Hormozgan, and southern South Khorasan, enjoy unwritten immunity from the judicial system and the government. These forces carry out unregulated shootings without judicial orders and in arbitrary ways, which annually result in the killing and injuring of dozens of Baloch citizens. Moreover, these forces threaten and pressure the victims' families to dissuade them from filing complaints against the perpetrators. Even when families of victims file complaints with judicial authorities, there is no proper investigation, or the case is dismissed without any outcome.




Allowing security forces to carry out arbitrary and unlawful actions, such as direct shootings at citizens, by judicial authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has led to increased violations of citizens' rights, heightened security concerns, and a growing fear among the people of the police and military agencies. In general, security forces in Balochistan exhibit extremely violent behavior toward Baloch citizens, and annual statistics on human rights violations by these forces reflect this reality.


Statistics on Baloch Deaths and Injuries by Security Forces

Based on a collection of reports gathered in 2024, direct and unregulated shootings, home raids using RPG fire or grenade explosions, car chases leading to road accidents, and mine explosions planted by security forces resulted in the death and injury of at least 208 Baloch citizens in various areas. Among these cases, 115 people were killed and 93 others injured, including 13 children and 4 women among the deceased, and 20 children and 12 women among the wounded. In the same year, 5 documented attacks on the homes of citizens occurred, where most of the victims, including children and women, were killed or injured in these raids, which were carried out both by land and air. It is also worth noting that in 7 cases of mine explosions, 14 people were killed and wounded, with 9 deaths and 5 injuries. Additionally, in 2024, security forces engaged in many car chases, 16 of which resulted in accidents and fatalities.




Extralegal Shooting by Military Forces









Government Discrimination Against the Baloch

The evident discriminatory attitude of the Iranian government toward the Baloch people has deprived them of not only their basic rights but also their constitutional rights. These include the right to hold top executive positions, such as the presidency, or high-ranking judicial roles. The Baloch people are relegated to the status of second- or even third-class citizens.

This systemic marginalization has normalized the deprivation of life and the execution of Baloch citizens, who are kept in a state of imposed poverty. This is carried out by all branches of the government, particularly the judiciary and security forces, with little to no reaction from activists or media. This silence has enabled the Islamic Republic to treat these inhumane practices as routine policy.



Arbitrary Shootings by Security Forces and Extrajudicial Killings of Baloch Citizens

The Law on the Use of Firearms, initially passed as a bill titled "The Use of Firearms by Law Enforcement Officers in Necessary Cases" in 1994, outlines strict conditions for the use of firearms by security forces. Article 3 of the law specifies that firearms can only be used when there are no other options, and only after following a progression of measures:

- Warning shots fired into the air
- Shots aimed below the waist
- Shots aimed above the waist, as a last resort.

However, in Balochistan and other Baloch-populated areas like Rudbar in southern Kerman, Guyavan in eastern Hormozgan, and southern South Khorasan, military and security forces frequently violate these provisions. Instead, they often engage in indiscriminate shootings at citizens without adhering to the outlined steps, leading to numerous fatalities and injuries.

Lack of Accountability and Arbitrary Actions

Military and security forces in Iran, particularly in Balochistan, enjoy an unwritten immunity provided by the judiciary and government authorities. They frequently carry out arbitrary shootings without judicial warrants, leading to the deaths or injuries of dozens of Baloch citizens annually. Victims' families are often threatened and pressured by these forces to prevent them from filing complaints against the perpetrators. Even in cases where complaints are lodged, judicial authorities either ignore them entirely or prematurely close the cases without resolution.

This de facto immunity has emboldened security forces to engage in illegal and arbitrary behavior, such as direct shootings at citizens, which further escalates fear, insecurity,



and public mistrust of the police and security forces. The annual statistics on human rights violations in Balochistan highlight the disproportionate violence directed at Baloch citizens by these forces.

Deaths and Injuries Caused by Security Forces

In 2024, reports documented 208 Baloch citizens killed or injured due to direct, arbitrary shootings, home raids using RPGs or grenades, vehicle chases leading to crashes, and landmine explosions planted by security forces.

Breakdown of Casualties:

- 115 fatalities and 93 injuries were reported.
- Among the fatalities:
- 13 children
- 4 women
- Among the injured:
- 20 children
- 12 women

There were 5 documented home raids involving both ground and aerial attacks, which disproportionately affected women and children. Additionally, 7 landmine explosions resulted in 14 casualties:

- 9 fatalities
- 5 injuries

Vehicle chases carried out by security forces also led to 16 incidents involving crashes and loss of life.

These statistics illustrate the widespread and systematic violence directed at Baloch citizens by Iranian military and security forces, with many incidents occurring under the



guise of maintaining security. Such actions not only violate basic human rights but also exacerbate fear and insecurity among the population.

Comparative Analysis of Casualties in 2023 and 2024 Caused by Security Actions

A statistical comparison of casualties resulting from arbitrary shootings and extrajudicial actions by military and security forces in 2023 and 2024 reveals a disturbing increase in such incidents.

2023 Statistics:

- 120 total casualties
- 80 fatalities
- 40 injuries
- Among the victims:
- 9 children
- 3 women

2024 Statistics:

- 208 total casualties
- 115 fatalities
- 93 injuries
- Among the victims:
- 33 children
- 16 women

Percentage Increases from 2023 to 2024:

Overall casualties: Increased by 73.34%

• Fatalities: Increased by 43.75%

Injuries: Increased by 132.50%



This sharp rise underscores the escalation in arbitrary and extrajudicial actions by military and security forces in Balochistan, further violating the Law on the Use of Firearms. The increase in the number of children and women among the victims also highlights the indiscriminate and reckless nature of these actions.

Clear Breach of Firearms Law in Balochistan

The dramatic increase in casualties is a clear indication of the systematic violation of the legal framework governing the use of firearms by security forces in Balochistan. This situation reflects not only the lack of accountability but also the normalization of excessive force against civilians, especially against vulnerable groups such as children and women.

Efforts to investigate and document these incidents are often obstructed, especially in cases where victims of arbitrary shootings lose their lives. Security forces frequently intimidate the families of victims, preventing them from seeking justice, further perpetuating a culture of impunity.

3. The Phenomenon of Armed Unknown Individuals

The term "armed unknown individuals" is used by the media to refer to the perpetrators of deadly attacks and killings in the Sistan and Balochistan province and other Balochmajority areas, whose identities remain largely unknown to the public. The motive behind these killings is often cited as "tribal conflicts and personal vendettas," but security agencies, including the IRGC, Ministry of Intelligence, and the anti-narcotics police, play a significant role, sometimes directly, in the killing of Baloch citizens. Reports have shown that security forces are often directly responsible for some of these killings, which then fuel tribal disputes, sometimes even leading to individuals being accused of "murder" and facing the inhumane punishment of execution.



For instance, on June 4, 2024, a report was released detailing a case where two Baloch citizens, Jalil Brahui (Anshini), aged 30, and Nematollah (Thanaullah) Taj Brahui (Anshini, Khaneshini), aged 28, were killed in Zahedan city on September 19, 2023, under the guise of an attack by unknown individuals. After the families of the victims filed complaints against suspected individuals, forensic investigations and weapon expert reports revealed that the perpetrators were members of the Zahedan police force.

Following the killing of Jalil and Thanaullah, tensions erupted between the Khaneshini and Zarozhi tribes of the Brahui clan, who were suspected of the murder. After nearly two years, on May 29, 2024, a reconciliation session was held at Zahedan's Maki Mosque with the mediation of Baloch elders and tribal leaders. The accused individuals swore on the Quran, pledging their innocence, and the dispute was officially settled.

Further investigations showed that several individuals from the Zarozhi tribe were initially suspected of the murders, but the case was dismissed by the public prosecutor's office, and the matter was transferred to the security judiciary, as no legal warrants were issued for the arrest or prosecution of the police officers involved.

In addition to this particular case, Baloch activists accuse security agencies, particularly the IRGC, of irresponsibly arming individuals with criminal backgrounds, often to serve their own security interests. This has led to an alarming rise in gun-related violence, particularly in tribal conflicts, with military-grade weapons like AK-47s in the hands of individuals tied to security agencies. Many Baloch activists, including some religious figures, have repeatedly protested this practice, but weapons distribution continues, with security agencies exacerbating the problem.

Reasons Behind the Proliferation of Arms in Balochistan:

One of the key reasons behind the widespread availability of arms in Balochistan is the distribution of weapons by the IRGC. The IRGC, motivated by security concerns, has



armed many tribal leaders and influential individuals in the region without proper oversight. This has led to a situation where these armed individuals, often with no accountability, use weapons for personal vendettas or criminal acts.

Another contributing factor is the "Sustainable Security Plan" initiated by the IRGC in 2008, which aimed to tackle armed Baloch opposition groups but involved arming tribal leaders and individuals with little consideration for regulation or training. This mismanagement of arms has not only fuelled further killings and tribal violence but also escalated the already volatile situation.

Security Agencies' Role in Exacerbating Tribal Conflicts


Security agencies, particularly the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC, are accused of exacerbating deadly tribal conflicts in Balochistan by arming factions involved in these disputes and failing to take proper action against the perpetrators. Some Baloch citizens believe that these agencies intentionally allow violence to escalate and even support the involved parties in exchange for loyalty or assistance with their own political and security objectives.

Statistics of Baloch Casualties Due to Attacks by "Armed Unknown Individuals":


According to reports compiled in 2024, at least 469 Baloch citizens have been attacked by "armed unknown individuals" in the region. Among the victims, 284 were killed and 185 were injured, including 47 children and women. Of these, 17 children and 9 women were killed, while 14 children and 7 women were wounded. While some of these killings may be attributed to personal disputes, the inability or, more accurately, the lack of willingness of security agencies to prosecute the culprits and reduce the number of casualties has led many human rights activists to view these incidents as part of a systemic issue.



Casualties in unknown Armed Shootings



Comparison of Casualties from Shootings by Unknown Armed Individuals in 2023 and 2024



The phenomenon of armed unknown individuals and widespread violence in Balochistan has become one of the most serious human and security crises, which has raised significant concerns at the local level. This situation not only endangers the lives of



innocent citizens but also fosters a sense of distrust and hopelessness among the people. To address this issue, several approaches can be considered:

- Transparency and Accountability of Security Institutions: Security agencies must demonstrate greater transparency in their actions and avoid behaviors that lead to violations of citizens' rights. This includes independent investigations into attacks and the identification of the real perpetrators behind these acts of violence.
- Strengthening Domestic Legal Mechanisms: The government should establish a strong and independent judiciary that can address complaints and issues related to violations of citizens' rights. Oversight of the performance of security forces is also essential.
- 3. The Role of International Human Rights Organizations: International human rights organizations should work closely with Balochi human rights organizations to document and publish information on violence and human rights violations in Balochistan, based on local reports and evidence. They should pressure the Iranian government and security agencies to hold them accountable for unlawful actions. Additionally, these organizations should support activists working in dangerous conditions.

4. Fuel Carriers

Fuel carrying is one of the few means through which many citizens in different parts of Balochistan have been forced to engage due to the lack of suitable and sustainable jobs, often facing dangers such as accidents, vehicle overturns, gunfire from military and security forces, and natural disasters. This profession has become one of the deadliest occupations for children, teenagers, and young Balochis. The main reasons for the widespread involvement of various segments of society in this activity are the dire economic conditions in Baloch areas and the absence of proper employment



opportunities, with the Islamic Republic of Iran having made no significant efforts to improve the economic situation or create sustainable jobs over the years.

Fuel Carriers are usually from the lower or middle classes, many of whom buy vehicles on credit or drive other people's vehicles in exchange for payment per trip. Many of these individuals cannot afford to buy vehicles or even drive them and resort to using motorcycles to transport fuel in order to make a living. Some of the carriers cannot even afford motorcycles and instead use donkeys to carry fuel, with security forces sometimes killing these animals or confiscating them. Fuel carriers usually carry fuel such as diesel and gasoline in unsafe containers in pickup trucks, cars, or even motorcycles and donkeys (for shorter distances). They transport the fuel from cities to border regions of neighboring countries. This takes place on unsafe, unpaved, and remote roads, where there is always the risk of accidents or pursuit by security forces. Along the way, fuel carriers face numerous dangers that can lead to tragic deaths, an experience that is rare in other parts of the world.

Further, we will examine the threats faced by fuel carriers:

4.1. Harsh Treatment by Security Forces: The Islamic Republic of Iran considers fuel carriers an "illegal activity" and defines it as part of a broader phenomenon of cross-border smuggling. This view has led to fuel carriers being viewed not as deprived citizens in need but as "criminals or smugglers." As a result, the government uses military and security forces, including the Revolutionary Guards and the Police, to confront carriers. This response includes direct gunfire, vehicle confiscations, and arrests. Direct gunfire by Iranian security forces against the carriers, often without warning or legal stop, is one of the most serious human rights crises in Balochistan, endangering the lives of many innocent people, including children and unrelated passersby. In many instances, security forces shoot directly at carriers' vehicles without providing a warning, which not only violates international laws but also, due to the overall hostile view toward the Balochi population, results in military personnel not being held accountable for killing



carriers, leading to an increase in such killings. Moreover, during pursuits, fuel carriers may be killed if their vehicles veer off the road due to gunfire.

- 4.2. Landmines Along Border Routes: The Revolutionary Guards, who were exclusively tasked with securing Balochistan's borders in the late 1980s, have laid landmines along various routes in areas such as Saravan and Mirjaveh. This practice is in violation of international law, as no warning signs or markers indicating "minefields" are placed, and in some areas, mines are covered with rocks. These landmines are even placed near settlements and villages, requiring citizens to take dangerous actions to defuse them to protect the community and livestock. Despite these efforts, villagers and herders who venture near their homes to graze their livestock are still killed by landmine explosions. These illegal mine-laying activities by security forces, particularly the Revolutionary Guards, put both the lives of ordinary citizens and fuel carriers at severe risk.
- 4.3. Inadequate Infrastructure and Road Accidents: Poor infrastructure is a key factor in increasing traffic accidents for fuel carriers and other Balochi citizens. This issue is not only a result of the government's neglect of regional development but also a sign of structural discrimination against the Balochi people. Road conditions in Balochistan, especially in Sistan and Balochistan province, are very poor and challenging, leading to high fatality rates from traffic accidents. Despite the province's strategic geographic location and sizable population, it suffers from severe infrastructure deficiencies. Many roads are narrow, unpaved, and dangerous, significantly raising the risks for carriers who are often pursued by security forces. This pursuit, combined with poorly maintained roads, threatens the safety and lives of carriers and other citizens, resulting in frequent accidents.
- 4.4. **Fires**: Transporting fuel in vehicles that are not properly equipped with safety measures can lead to fires or explosions from even the smallest spark. In recent years, hundreds of fuel carriers have died in fires caused by various incidents. Due to military



pressure, carriers are often forced to drive at high speeds to deliver their fuel, increasing the risk of accidents. They also use difficult routes to reach border areas for fuel distribution, which heightens the risks of fires caused by collisions, gunfire, or other factors. Fires at fuel storage areas, known as "mandis," are particularly dangerous, as these sites are contaminated with fuels like gasoline and diesel, and even small sparks can ignite flames, killing both citizens and carriers.

- 4.5. **Robbery by Armed Criminals**: Fuel carriers often face threats from armed robbers, particularly in unsafe border areas. Poverty, unemployment, and the lack of job opportunities have driven many people to armed robbery, using carriers as a source of financial gain. In recent years, armed robbers have ambushed fuel carriers along their routes, stealing their goods or even hijacking their vehicles. Some of these robbers have connections within security forces, making it easier for them to carry out these attacks with the support of military or security personnel.
- 4.6. **Natural Disasters**: Natural disasters, particularly floods, are a constant threat to fuel carriers, especially in areas with dry riverbeds or difficult terrain. Heavy rains and sudden floods can turn roads into impassable rivers, putting carriers and their vehicles at risk of being swept away. Many of the routes used by carriers lack proper infrastructure, and due to the lack of weather prediction systems in remote areas, carriers are often unaware of imminent floods, which has led to deaths by drowning in recent years.

Iran's Contradictory Approach to Fuel Carriers

The Islamic Republic of Iran has shown a contradictory and inconsistent response to fuel carriers. On the one hand, the government treats it as illegal and cracks down on it with violence and suppression. On the other hand, it attempts to portray itself as a supporter of border communities through programs like "Razaq," which began in 2021 with the goal of creating sustainable income for border residents and reducing organized fuel carriers.



However, due to structural issues, inefficiency, and widespread corruption, these initiatives have failed to achieve their goals. The program has been limited in scope and does not benefit all fuel carriers, leaving many to continue their informal activities. This failure reflects the government's neglect of the deeper economic and social issues in Balochistan. To genuinely address these problems, a fundamental shift in policy and the adoption of comprehensive and humane strategies are needed. Without economic development and community participation, any plans in this area will be doomed to failure.

Social Consequences of Fuel Carriers and the Impact of Fuel Carrier Killings on Families and the Baloch Community

Fuel carrying, as one of the most dangerous jobs in Balochistan, has had deep social consequences on the families and the community of this region. This job is a result of the historical poverty and deprivation of the Baloch people, the discriminatory views of the rulers over the past several decades, and the systemic violence directed against them. The death or injury of fuel carriers not only places their families into economic and psychological crises, but it also exposes the broader Baloch community to greater challenges. With the repeated incidents related to fuel carriers, death and violence have become part of the daily life of the people, as if the systematic normalization of death and violence is being executed by the ruling authorities.


Furthermore, many fuel carriers are the primary breadwinners of their families, and their death or injury causes severe economic problems for the family. Families who lose their loved ones in this dangerous trade experience psychological shock and a sense of injustice. In addition to these issues, it must be noted that with the loss of the breadwinner, families fall into even deeper poverty, and many of them become dependent on public aid or temporary, low-paying jobs. Also, children in these families are often forced to drop out of school to help support the family, entering into hard labor, which creates even bigger problems in the Baloch community.




Fuel Carrier Deaths and Injuries in 2024

According to reports gathered from the beginning of 2024 until its end, at least 479 fuel carriers have been killed or injured in road accidents, shootings by security forces, attacks by armed unknown individuals, mine explosions, fires, and drownings. Among these, 253 have died, and 226 have been injured. In shootings, chases, and beatings by military forces, 136 people have been killed or injured, with 63 deaths and 75 injuries, two of which were caused by shooting by Pakistani military forces. In attacks and shootings by armed unknown individuals and thieves, 3 fuel carriers have been killed, and 7 have been injured. In this year, at least two fuel carriers drowned during fuel carrying activities. Additionally, in fires, 3 people lost their lives, and 7 others suffered burns.

Statistics of Fuel Carriers Casualties in 2024 (Total: 479)







5. Destruction of Homes and Seizure of Ancestral Lands of the Baloch

Over the past decade, the Islamic Republic of Iran has rapidly pursued a highly disastrous and harmful plan in the Baloch-inhabited regions, spanning 675 kilometers of Balochistan's coastline (Makran), from Minab in the Giyawan area of Balochistan in the east of Hormozgan province to the Gwadar Gulf on the border with Balochistan. This malicious plan, part of which has been openly declared as part of development and poverty alleviation efforts, carries a catastrophic impact, with its hidden goals being pursued covertly. The so-called "Makran Coast Development" plan, also known in Balochistan as the "Seizure of Balochistan's Coastline," is being followed more aggressively after a renewed directive from Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in 2014. This involves the formation of various public and secret working groups in several ministries and numerous state institutions. To achieve these anti-Baloch objectives, three parallel and strategic projects are being pursued, which complement and strengthen each other. These include:



5.1. Sending Millions of People to the Coasts of Balochistan (Population Settlement)

In March 2017, according to a report from Asriran citing the House of the People, Akbar Turkan, the former secretary of the Supreme Council of Free Trade Zones, stated that the "Makran Coast Development" plan was included in the Sixth Development Plan, with the primary goal of settling 2.5 million people along the Makran coastline. The mass migration to the Makran coast, framed as the "Makran Coast Development," could have severe environmental, cultural, social, economic, and human rights implications, some of which focus on the violation of human rights and international law:

- a. Violation of the Rights of Indigenous People: The large-scale migration to regions where the culture and identity of the indigenous population (here, the Baloch nation) are completely different can lead to the destruction of the culture, language, and national identity of the Baloch. The demographic changes could marginalize the Baloch people, limiting their access to resources and opportunities.
- b. Poverty and Social Discrimination: Given the historical policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Baloch people, the unequal distribution of resources between the indigenous population and the migrants may exacerbate social inequality. The Baloch people might be deprived of new job opportunities due to the preference for non-Baloch workers.
- c. Security Issues: Demographic changes and the dissatisfaction of the local population might lead to heightened social and political tensions. The disagreements caused by these changes could lead to increased protests, strikes, and widespread social and political opposition. The sense of threat and injustice could drive some local groups toward resistance and opposition to the state.



Population Settlement Plan and Violation of International Law

The proposed plan might violate several human rights principles and international laws. According to Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), all nations have the right to self-determination. If this plan is implemented without consulting or obtaining the consent of the indigenous people, it could be in violation of this principle. Additionally, Article 27 of the ICCPR guarantees that ethnic, linguistic, and cultural minorities have the right to preserve their culture, language, and identity. The mass migration could lead to the destruction of the indigenous culture, which would be a clear violation of Article 27. Another important issue is the right to access natural resources, as outlined in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states that indigenous communities have the right to control their lands and resources. Changing the demographic composition and exploiting resources for the benefit of non-indigenous people would be a violation of this right.

Given that the relocation or migration of millions to the coasts of Balochistan requires suitable land and basic living facilities, coupled with the discriminatory policies of the Islamic Republic in Balochistan, such issues are not far from the minds of the Baloch people living in these coastal areas. In recent years, government and military organizations have used various pretexts, such as national lands or lack of legal documents, to seize the ancestral lands of the local people—lands that have been inhabited and cultivated by their ancestors for hundreds of years. These lands are being seized and developed into cities for the settlement of non-Baloch populations, with special privileges being granted to them.

5. 2. Division of Sistan and Balochistan Province (Territorial Planning)

The proposal to divide Sistan and Balochistan Province, suggested by some officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is seen by many Baloch people and human rights activists



as a discriminatory plan that undermines the rights and identity of the Baloch nation. Hedayatollah Mir-Morad-Zahi, a conservative representative in the 9th Iranian Parliament, proposed the division of Balochistan to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president at the time, in the early 1990s, which faced severe opposition from the Baloch people, social activists, political leaders, and religious figures. This plan has been pursued by hardline representatives such as Hossein Ali Shahriari and Habibollah Dehmardeh, and it is gradually being implemented alongside other complementary plans. The people of Balochistan argue that the divisions in the past, which led to parts of Balochistan being annexed to the current provinces of Kerman and Hormozgan, have not led to any significant progress or development. Instead, these regions have become marginalized areas with no improvement.

The division could bring multiple consequences and challenges, including:

a. Weakening Baloch National Identity and Unity: Dividing the province into smaller parts could weaken the cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of the Baloch nation, as each part would be influenced by non-Baloch populations or central policies. This could erode the unity needed to safeguard their rights and interests.

b. Reduction in Political Power and Local Participation: Dividing the province may reduce the political power of the Baloch people, distancing their representatives from key decision-making positions at the provincial or national level. Additionally, smaller provinces may be more directly controlled by the central government, reducing the political influence of the indigenous people.

c. Exacerbating Economic Inequality and Discrimination: The newly created provinces might be governed with smaller budgets and less efficient management, further deepening the economic issues faced by the Baloch people. Richer or strategically important areas might be managed by non-Baloch officials, while poorer regions might be left for the Baloch.



- d. Demographic Changes and the Erosion of Baloch Language and Identity: Dividing the province might lead to targeted migration of non-Baloch people to the new provinces, altering the demographic composition in favor of non-Baloch populations. This change could erode the Baloch people's cultural and social influence in their ancestral lands.
- e. Destruction of Unified Development Opportunities: A unified province could implement broader, more coordinated development programs. Dividing the province into smaller parts might result in the dispersion of resources and a lack of coordination in the implementation of infrastructure and economic projects. The smaller provinces may be deprived of large-scale investments and development plans.
- f. Violation of Human Rights and the Right to Self-Determination: The division of the province without the consultation and consent of the Baloch people could violate their right to self-determination, a principle guaranteed in international human rights documents. Such an action may be regarded by the international community as discrimination against a specific nationality.

5.3. Destruction of Homes and Seizure of Ancestral Lands of the Baloch in Conjunction with the Migration of Non-Baloch Populations

In recent years, with the implementation of projects like the "Development of the Makran Coasts" plan, the Mahaan company, affiliated with military-governmental foundations that have significant influence in the government, has seized thousands of hectares of land in the Dashtiari region under the pretext of projects like banana planting, building desalination plants, and constructing an airport. The company also uses the water from the Pishin dam exclusively, leaving the region's farmers without access to the available water and land. The residents of Dashtiari believe that this project, due to the deprivation of the local people from its benefits, has undermined the interests of the region's residents, and despite promises made by officials, it has led to greater deprivation.



Agriculture and animal husbandry are the only livelihoods of the people of Dashtiari, and without sufficient land and water, they face serious difficulties.

The seizure of more than 4,000 hectares of agricultural land from areas such as Bahuklat in Dashtiari by the Mahaan transportation company, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has led to the neglect of the people's concerns, despite protests in recent years. The lands have not been returned to their original owners, and this has caused growing anxiety among the residents of Dashtiari. According to reports received by BHRG, in the years 1373 and 1374 (1994–1995 in the Gregorian calendar), the Natural Resources Department and the Bank used ploys like declaring people's lands as "national lands," registering ancestral lands as national lands, and now these lands are under the control of the Mahaan company. These lands, which have legal records dating back to 1342 (1963), and even have remains of three-century-old irrigation systems, have historically belonged to the people of the region.

Additionally, in recent years, at least 3,000 hectares of ancestral land from Baloch citizens in areas such as Sirik have been seized under various pretexts like "national lands" by governmental and military organizations, and transferred to the Mahaan air transportation company, affiliated with the IRGC. These lands, located downstream of the Jegin Dam between Sirik and Jask in the Gayawan region of Balochistan, have belonged to Baloch residents for generations, who have farmed and lived on them for centuries, but recently, they have been handed over to security and governmental entities.

In this context, Parviz Salari, the director of the Transparency and Justice Watch in Hormozgan, expressed his concerns about the transfer of several agricultural land plots in this region to the Mahaan airline company. He voiced the concerns and dissatisfaction of the local residents with the security-governmental authorities. Salari raised objections about the transfer of 3,000 hectares of agricultural lands in Bandar Jask and Sirik to



Mahaan Air, stating, "How do we know that the Marashi family won't change the land usage in the future and turn them into hotels or other developments?"

In the Chabahar district, various governmental agencies have seized vast amounts of land from local residents, and in some areas, they do not even register property deeds for ordinary people. On August 16, 2024, in the Friday prayer ceremony in Chabahar, Molavi Abdulwahid Bozorgzadeh criticized the difficulties faced by the people in obtaining official land deeds, saying, "People in Chabahar have lived on the land for fifty or sixty years, and in some cases, there are multiple deeds for the same land. This is a problem that exists in Chabahar, and in other districts, such issues are less common. People, who know the value of Chabahar's land, use influence and connections to register the lands of others, causing problems for the local people."

He further added that the Housing and Urban Development Department has registered land plots as "exempt land" for itself. While these lands belong to the people, those whose lands are within the exempt land areas should be able to easily register their property deeds, but the Housing Department is preventing this, which he considered to be an injustice to the people. He also expressed opposition to the seizure of people's lands by the "Imam Khomeini Relief Committee." These land seizures are happening even in cases where people have been living on these lands for years.

In the northern parts of Balochistan, including Zahedan, the provincial capital, similar policies are being implemented by the governmental authorities. The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its diplomatic weaknesses and unwillingness to take serious steps to secure the rights of the people in the Sistan region and the Hamun Wetlands, is executing population transfer policies. This has forced many residents of this region, especially those with closer ties to the government, to migrate to areas like Zahedan and even to northern provinces. This migration has put considerable pressure on the native Baloch people in Zahedan. With the influence of migrants in governmental positions and agencies, they have received facilities for settlement in Zahedan, which has led to the



marginalization of the local Baloch population. According to reports received by BHRG, influential governmental figures have pressured provincial officials to expel the Baloch people from their ancestral lands, intending to give these lands to the migrants. Additionally, the destruction of Baloch homes in Zahedan and surrounding villages has significantly increased in recent years, indicating that the various plans mentioned above are all part of a coordinated effort aimed at a specific goal: the blatant violation of the rights of Baloch citizens.

Statistics on the Destruction of Homes of Baloch Citizens by City


The destruction of homes and seizure of ancestral lands of Baloch citizens has been an ongoing issue for many years. However, with the implementation of the state's recent policies aimed at suppressing and controlling the protests of the people in Balochistan and also national homogenization and the elimination of the identities of other nations (which constitutes a clear violation of human rights), the frequency of these actions has significantly increased. Throughout 2024, security institutions such as the IRGC and governmental organizations, including the Housing Foundation, Natural Resources Department, and local municipalities, carried out at least 36 cases of destroying homes of Baloch citizens and places of worship for Sunnis. Zahedan and Chabahar each recorded 17 of these cases, with one house being burned down in Delgan and one Sunni mosque being destroyed in Bam.

DalganBam 3/03/0

House Demolition statistics in 2024



In many of these cases, security forces involved in these operations, despite homeowners' requests to present a judicial warrant, have refused to comply and instead assaulted the homeowners, causing injuries to citizens. A comparison of statistics on home demolitions by government entities shows a 71.43% increase compared to 2023, during which 21 cases were recorded.



House Demolition in 2023 and 2024

6. Deaths of Baloch Prisoners in Prisons

The condition of prisons in Balochistan, particularly the treatment of Baloch prisoners, is a stark symbol of human rights violations and systemic disregard for human dignity. These prisons, instead of serving as places for reform and rehabilitation, have become sites of suffering and destruction, reflecting the social inequality and injustice faced by the Baloch people. Baloch prisoners are held in conditions where even the most basic sanitary and human rights standards are not observed. Prison environments are often overcrowded, filthy, and lack proper ventilation. In such settings, infectious diseases spread rapidly, threatening the lives of prisoners. Alongside these conditions, the lack of medical facilities and limited access to healthcare services multiply this threat. Many prisoners not only go untreated when ill but are also deprived of even the most basic care. In cases where a prisoner's physical condition deteriorates, negligence and




indifference from prison authorities often make it impossible to save their lives. Reports of Baloch prisoners dying due to delayed medical treatment or even intentional neglect by authorities reflect discriminatory and inhumane policies. These victims are the casualties of policies that disregard basic human rights and sacrifice humanity for political oppression and discrimination.

Furthermore, Baloch prisoners face additional discrimination due to their national and religious identity. Restrictions on family visits, psychological and physical pressure, and deprivation of basic necessities are some of the hardships these individuals endure in prison. This approach has transformed the prison into a tool for political pressure against the Baloch people. The prisons of Balochistan are not only a local symbol of human rights violations but also reflect a systemic discrimination and the failure to uphold justice on a national scale.

According to reports recorded in 2024, at least six Baloch prisoners and detainees have died in two prisons in Zahedan and Zabol, with one additional case in the Zahedan "Anti-Drug" detention facility. Five of the deaths in the Zahedan and Zabol prisons were due to medical negligence and the failure of prison authorities to provide timely and proper care, with three occurring in Zahedan prison and two in Zabol prison. In the Zahedan Anti-Drug detention facility, one person was killed due to severe torture by prison guards. Additionally, one prisoner died in Zabol prison, though the cause of death remains unclear to the BHRG.





Silence in the face of these conditions implies tacit approval of these injustices. It is necessary for human rights organizations, international bodies, and human rights defenders to respond more vigorously to this crisis and take practical steps to end this unacceptable situation. Preserving human dignity is a universal responsibility that should not be sacrificed for political considerations or social indifference.

7. Summoning and Interrogating Baloch Citizens and Activists

In 2024, the security and even judicial institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran deviated from formal laws and legal procedures by summoning Baloch citizens in many cases with a mere phone call. This illegal practice, carried out without an official summons or necessary explanations, has become one of the tools for exerting pressure and suppressing Baloch activists and the Baloch community. Citizens summoned in this way are often interrogated at institutions such as the Ministry of Intelligence or the IRGC Intelligence Division. Reports indicate that these individuals are not only subjected to



verbal and psychological threats but also face insulting behavior and illegal pressures in some cases. This method of treatment is a clear violation of basic human rights and judicial fairness.

Many individuals who are summoned in this manner refrain from reporting these cases due to direct or indirect threats from the security institutions. As a result, many of these violations remain hidden from public view, and there is no accurate report on the scale of this issue. However, BHRG has managed to document several such summons in 2024. These reports show that this illegal method is not only a tool for exerting pressure on activists and Baloch citizens but also a deliberate attempt to create an atmosphere of fear and terror in the Baloch community. Based on reports recorded this year, at least 38 cases of summons of Baloch citizens and activists occurred, with 32 of them in Zahedan, and one case each in the cities of Khash, Zabol, Saravan, Iranshahr, Taftan, and Rask.

These telephone summons by Iran's security and judicial institutions, often carried out without adherence to legal and human rights standards, represent a flagrant violation of the rights of Baloch citizens. These actions, accompanied by threats, pressure, and intimidation, not only undermine public trust in the judicial and security systems but also contribute to the intensification of suppression and discrimination against the Baloch community. It is crucial and urgent for the responsible institutions to end these illegal practices and ensure justice and human rights.

8. Arrest of Baloch Citizens

The arrest of Baloch citizens is often carried out without following legal procedures and is accompanied by behaviors that are clearly in violation of basic human rights principles. The security forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran typically arrest individuals without informing them of the charges or providing a valid judicial order. These arrests usually take place at homes, workplaces, or even in the streets, and are always accompanied by violent and humiliating methods. Mistreatment of detainees begins



immediately upon arrest. Reports of beatings, threats, and insults indicate a lack of respect for human dignity and basic rights by the security forces. This method of arrest is in clear contradiction with the domestic laws of the Islamic Republic and its international human rights commitments. Detainees are often held in security detention centers for long periods and are deprived of access to legal counsel and family visits. This process, aimed at creating an atmosphere of fear and terror within the Baloch community, has become one of the main tools for systematic repression of the Baloch people.

In 2024, the illegal arrests of Baloch citizens by Iran's security institutions became widespread and turned into a clear example of human rights violations. According to BHRG reports, at least 364 people were arrested, including several cases of illegal and repressive behavior. Among the detainees, at least five women, two of whom were under 18, and 18 boys under 18 were arrested. Additionally, 17 detainees did not have identification documents, which made their situation even more complicated. In some cases, these individuals were transferred to foreign deportation camps without their families' knowledge and were then deported to Afghanistan. This action created numerous problems for the deported individuals. In Afghanistan, they faced multiple crises, including lack of shelter, absence of basic needs, and security threats. Furthermore, their attempts to return to Balochistan and cross the border were met with direct gunfire from the Iranian border guards. Reports of people being killed and missing in these situations further exacerbated the crisis.

The actions of the Islamic Republic's security forces towards Baloch citizens, especially illegal arrests, constitute a clear violation of human rights principles. These actions not only violate the individual rights of the detainees but also serve as a tool for suppressing the Baloch community and spreading public fear. Human rights and international organizations must investigate these cases more seriously and demand that Iranian authorities adhere to their human rights and legal obligations. Ending this illegal process is a crucial step towards achieving justice and securing the rights of the Baloch people.



9. Report on Employment Conditions and Occupational Hazards for Baloch Workers in 2024

The lack of sustainable employment and job opportunities in Balochistan is one of the main challenges faced by Baloch citizens. The absence of large industries, government neglect in developing infrastructure, and unjust economic policies have led many Baloch citizens to migrate to other provinces in Iran, where they work under difficult and exploitative conditions. These workers, often employed in physically demanding and low-paying jobs, generally lack basic welfare and legal rights such as insurance. Additionally, poor monitoring of workplace safety conditions by authorities has exposed these individuals to serious life-threatening risks. The lack of safety standards in workplaces, especially in the construction and industrial sectors, has significantly increased the incidence of workplace accidents.

Workplace Accident and Fatality Statistics in 2024

According to documented data, in 2024, at least 62 Baloch workers in Balochistan and other provinces of Iran were killed or injured in various accidents. The details of these incidents are as follows:

Lack of workplace safety: 14 incidents (11 killed, 3 injured)

Road accidents: 30 incidents (5 killed, 25 injured)

• Fires: 7 incidents (3 killed, 4 injured)

Suffocation due to lack of oxygen: 1 killed

Illness: 1 death

Employer violence: 1 injured

Gas poisoning and intoxication: 4 incidents (3 killed, 1 injured)

These statistics highlight the high risks and lack of safety for Baloch workers, who are often employed in difficult working conditions without legal support.



10. Baloch Children

Baloch children in the Islamic Republic of Iran face widespread violations of their fundamental rights. This violation is the result of a series of discriminatory actions, neglect, and policies imposed on the Baloch people over the years. Baloch children, who should grow up in a safe and supportive environment, face challenges that not only violate their childhood rights but also threaten their uncertain future. The lack of educational and healthcare infrastructure is one of the most prominent challenges. In many parts of Balochistan, there are no basic educational facilities such as schools, qualified teachers, or even educational supplies. In areas where schools exist, the long distance from children's homes and the lack of transportation systems deprives many of their right to education. Furthermore, the absence of adequate policies to encourage families to send their children to school has forced many Baloch children, due to extreme poverty or the need to help their families, to abandon their education and enter the workforce.

BHRG's reports from 2024 show that at least 42 Baloch children, from one day old to seventeen years old, have died due to various causes, including medical negligence, lack of specialists, insect bites, animal attacks, suicide, falls from heights, disappearance, gunshots, poisoning, gas poisoning, fires, and drowning. The average age of the children whose ages were confirmed in the reports is approximately eight years old.

Systematic discrimination against Baloch children in all these areas not only constitutes a flagrant violation of international children's rights but also reflects the Iranian government's failure to meet its human rights commitments. This situation requires urgent action to change policies and allocate the necessary resources to improve the lives of Baloch children. Attention to education, healthcare, and the creation of equal opportunities for all children could be a fundamental step in reducing inequalities and improving living conditions in Balochistan.



11. Report on Drowning Incidents and Their Statistics in 2024

In 2024, according to reports registered by BHRG, 90 individuals lost their lives due to drowning in various areas of Balochistan. Among these individuals, 54 were children, one was a 19-year-old woman, and 5 were non-Baloch. These incidents occurred in places such as ditches, floods, rivers, seas, dams, swimming pools, and wells. The lack of appropriate recreational and entertainment facilities for children and Baloch citizens, especially during the summer, has led many to seek swimming in rivers and water bodies. The lack of swimming skills and unawareness of water depth have been primary factors in these tragedies. Additionally, unexpected floods have claimed the lives of many people who are forced to cross rivers during rainy seasons due to the lack of bridges.

These incidents, in addition to causing irreparable harm to families, reflect the weaknesses in the region's recreational and educational infrastructure. Establishing swimming training centers, building safe bridges, and expanding recreational facilities are fundamental solutions to prevent these tragedies. Addressing these deficiencies not only saves lives but also guarantees the natural right of Baloch citizens to live securely and peacefully.



Conclusion

Human rights organizations can pressure the international community and governments to hold the Iranian government accountable. They can refer human rights violations in Balochistan to international bodies such as the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, demanding independent investigations and targeted sanctions against the responsible officials. Furthermore, these organizations can leverage their capacity to create global movements and garner public support in various countries to raise the issue of Balochistan on a global scale. Additionally, these organizations can provide direct support to the victims of human rights violations and their families, including legal counselling, financial resources, and psychological support.

Strengthening local networks of Baloch activists will create better conditions for documentation and accurate reporting. Raising awareness globally and attracting media attention is another key action that can pressure the Iranian government to change its repressive policies in Balochistan.

List of Baloch people executed in 2024

توضيحات	محل اعدام	اتهام	تاريخ اعدام	اهل	نام پدر	سن	نام و نام خانوادگی	ردیف
	یزد	مواد مخدر	7.74/.1/11	زاهدان	بازمحمد	۴۸	نظام دهمرده	١
	زاهدان	قتل	7.74/.1/7.	زاهدان	حنيف	77	حسن گرگیج	۲
	زاهدان	قتل	7.74/.1/77	زاهدان	عبدالعزيز	74	مسعود ریگی	٣
بدون شناسنامه و ملاقات	بيرجند	مواد مخدر	7.74/.1/7A	زابل	ظاهر	74	عارف اسحاقز هی	۴
بدون ملاقات و شناسنامه	بيرجند	مواد مخدر	T. T*/. 1/TA	زابل	ظاهر	٣٠	عاصف اسحاقز هی	۵



	خاش	قتل	7.74/.7/.7	زابل	-	۲٩	میلاد گلوی	9
	گنبد کاووس	قتل	7.74/.7/9	گلستان	سید احمد	۲۵	فرشاد رخشان <i>ی</i>	٧
	قزويين	مواد مخدر	7.74/.7/.٧	زهک	ابراهيم	44	حميد گرگيج	٨
	چابهار	مواد مخدر	7.74/.4/71	دشتیاری	لالمحمد	٣.	سعيد جدگال	٩
	چابھار	مواد مخدر	7.74/.4/71	دشتیار ی	مولابخش	٣٣	محمد انجمروز	١.
	كرمان	مواد مخدر	7.74/.4/71	زابل	محمد	44	احمدر ضا میری	11
	كرمان	مواد مخدر	7.74/.4/71	1	-	۵۳	شمسالدین کاشانی	17
	كرمان	مواد مخدر	7.74/.4/71	زاهدان	-	-	شوكت شەبخش	۱۳
	كرمان	مواد مخدر	7.74/.4/71	-	-	-	نامشخص	14
دار ای کارت قرمز روانشناسی	بندر عباس	قتل	7.74/.4/7A	سر او ان	عبدالواحد	٣۵	ر اشد بلوچی	10
	گنبدكاووس	قتل	7.74/.4/7	گلستان	ملكشاه	٣۶	منصور نارویی	19
	قائن	ı	7.74/.4/7	زاهدان	1	-	نامشخص	١٧
	قائن	1	T. T * / T * / T / A	مثبهد	1	1	نام) نامشخص (براهویی	١٨
	قائن	مواد مخدر	7.74/.4/7	گلستان	آفاگل	۲٧	محسن کرمی	١٩
	اصفهان	مواد مخدر	7.74/.4/79	-	-	-	نامشخص	۲.
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